

Message Text

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ORIGIN NEA-16

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 RSC-01 SS-20 SSO-00 ISO-00 ACDA-19

EUR-25 NSC-07 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 INR-10 IO-14 L-03

NSAE-00 SCI-06 FEA-02 USIE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03

PA-04 PRS-01 SP-03 AID-20 OMB-01 TRSE-00 AEC-11

INRE-00 /174 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/INS:DKUX:EI

APPROVED BY NEA:SSOBER

ACDA - MR. W. F. GIVAN

S/S - DWMILLER

EUR/CAN - MR. KRUSE

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 110646

TOSEC 1030, ZFF JERUSALEM ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: TECH, IN

SUBJECT: CANADIAN DEMARCHE ON INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST

1. SUMMARY: CANADIANS CALLED AT DEPARTMENT MAY 24 TO
EXPLAIN THEIR CONCERNS ABOUT DAMAGING IMPACT OF INDIAN
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NUCLEAR TEST AND OUTLINE MEASURES THEY WERE TAKING. THEY

ASKED HOW USG VIEWED SITUATION AND EXPRESSED HOPE WE AND OTHERS WOULD IMPOSE RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH INDIA. END SUMMARY.

2. CANADIAN MINISTER WILLIAMSON, ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSELOR FRASER, CALLED UNDER INSTRUCTION MAY 24 ON NEA ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY SOBER REGARDING INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST. WILLIAMSON SAID HE WANTED TO DRAW USG'S ATTENTION TO CANADIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER SHARP'S MAY 22 STATEMENT AS WELL AS CABINET DECISION ON INDIA NUCLEAR PROBLEM. CANADA WAS CONCERNED REGARDING DAMAGE INDIAN ACTION WOULD HAVE ON EFFORTS TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION AS WELL AS FACT THAT CANADA HAD PROVIDED LARGE AMOUNT OF AID TO INDIA IN NUCLEAR FIELD. CANADA COULD NOT BE EXPECTED TO SUBSIDIZE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES PROGRAM. OVER THE YEARS CANADA HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THIS WAS SAME THING AS WEAPONS PROGRAM BECAUSE OF SIMILARITY OF TECHNOLOGY.

3. ACCORDINGLY, WILLIAMSON SAID CANADIAN CABINET HAD

DECIDED ON NUMBER OF MEASURES:

-- INDIANS WERE BEING ASKED TO ADVISE CANADA REGARDING SOURCE OF PLUTONIUM (CANADIANS SUSPECTED PLUTONIUM CAME FROM UNSAFEGUARDED CIRUS REACTOR WHICH CANADA HAD PROVIDED INDIANS).

-- CANADIAN ATOMIC ENERGY REPRESENTATIVE WAS BEING RECALLED FROM BOMBAY.

-- ALL SHIPMENTS OF ATOMIC ENERGY EQUIPMENT AND MATERIAL AND ALL COOPERATION IN ATOMIC ENERGY FIELD WERE SUSPENDED.

-- ALL OTHER ASPECTS OF CANADIAN AID TO INDIA, EXCEPT FOR FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, WERE BEING REVIEWED.

-- CANADIAN PARTICIPATION IN DEBT RESCHEDULING WOULD BE HELD UP BECAUSE A LARGE COMPONENT WAS RELATED CONFIDENTIAL

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TO LOANS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD.

-- INDIANS WERE BEING ASKED TO ELABORATE ON ECONOMIC BENEFITS THEY EXPECTED FROM TEST AND HOW THEY SAW PNE'S FITTING INTO INDIAN ECONOMIC PRIORITIES.

4. CANADA WAS ALSO APPROACHING OTHER GOVERNMENTS WITH REQUEST THEY SIMILARLY SUSPEND NUCLEAR COOPERATION IN

THE FACE OF THE INDIAN ACTION. CANADA RECOGNIZED THAT NPT SUPPORTERS FACED DILEMMA IN PRESENT SITUATION. SPECIAL EFFORT COULD BE MADE TO FIT INDIA INTO NPT REGIME IN ORDER TO LESSEN CHANCE THAT INDIA WOULD OPT FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS ROUTE; HOWEVER, THIS WOULD ONLY MAKE IT EASIER FOR OTHERS TO TAKE SAME STEP AS INDIA HAD.

5. CANADA, THEREFORE, WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW US VIEWS SITUATION AND WHAT WE INTENDED TO DO TO LIMIT DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES OF INDIAN TEST. SOBER STATED THAT US POSITION REMAINS UNCHANGED, NAMELY THAT WE WERE OPPOSED TO NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION BECAUSE OF ADVERSE IMPACT IT HAD ON GLOBAL STABILITY. AT SAME TIME, SOBER SAID WE WERE EXAMINING PROBLEM AND CONSIDERING ITS MANY IMPLICATIONS. WHEN WE HAD COMPLETED REVIEW, WE WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH CANADIANS.

6. SOBER ASKED WHAT PRACTICAL EFFECT SUSPENSION OF CANADIAN NUCLEAR SHIPMENTS TO INDIA WOULD BE. FRASER SAID HE DID NOT THINK THIS WOULD HAVE TOO MUCH IMPACT AS MOST EQUIPMENT ALREADY SHIPPED FOR SECOND RAJASTHAN REACTOR; PERHAPS MOST SERIOUS RESULT, IF CANADIAN

SUSPENSION WAS OF LONG DURATION, RELATED TO CONTRACT FOR SUPPLIES OF HEAVY WATER TO RAJASTHAN REACTOR.

7. SOBER NOTED THAT PAK FONMIN AZIZ AHMED WAS GOING TO CANADA AFTER HIS VISIT HERE; PAKS WERE SOMEWHAT CONCERNED CANADIANS MIGHT REEXAMINE THEIR ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POWER PLANT IN LIGHT OF INDIAN TEST. FRASER SAID HE DID NOT SEE PROBLEM AS THE PAKS HAD MADE CLEAR TO CANADA THAT THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF RENOUNCING THE SAFEGUARDS UNDER WHICH CANADIAN AID WAS BEING PROVIDED. THE CONFIDENTIAL

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SITUATION WAS VERY DIFFERENT FROM INDIAN CASE WHERE INADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS FOR THE CIRUS REACTOR SEEMED TO HAVE PROVIDED LOOPHOLE WHICH PERMITTED INDIANS TO DEVELOP EXPLOSIVES PROGRAM.

8. IN SEPARATE CALL ON ACDA ASSISTANT DIRECTOR MILLER, CANADIAN COUNSELOR SINGLETON COVERED MUCH OF SAME GROUND AS ABOVE, ALSO MAKING ESSENTIALLY SAME POINTS REVIEWED IN VIENNA WITH US/IAEA, BUT WITHOUT SUGGESTING EARLY MEETING OF ZANGGER (NUCLEAR SUPPLIER COUNTRY) COMMITTEE. SINGLETON SAID CANADA WAS APPROACHING ALL MEMBERS OF ZANGGER COMMITTEE PLUS FRANCE AND USSR ON PROBLEM. CANADA WAS CONSIDERING SEEKING COMMITMENT FROM INDIANS NOT TO USE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES EXCEPT FOR PEACEFUL USES AND NOT TO SHARE RELEVANT TECHNOLOGY WITH OTHER NON-

NUCLEAR STATES. CANADIANS RECOGNIZED THIS WOULD GIVE
INDIA SPECIAL STATUS AND COULD CREATE DIFFICULTIES WITH
OTHER NON-NUCLEAR STATES. IN MEANTIME, CANADIANS SEEKING
VIEWS OF US AND OTHERS ON BEST COURSE OF ACTION. RUSH

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: NPT, DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, NUCLEAR TESTS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 25 MAY 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE110646
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: DKUX:EI
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740131-0686
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740516/aaaaaov.tel
Line Count: 173
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 26 MAR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <26 MAR 2002 by collinp0>; APPROVED <08 MAY 2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CANADIAN DEMARCHE ON INDIAN NUCLEAR TEST
TAGS: TECH, IN, CA
To: JERUSALEM MULTIPLE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005